KYSC - Blake - Traffic Stop

Commonwealthv. Blake, 2016-SC-346-DG, to be published

The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision suppressing the evidence seized from the defendant’s car.  Two officers worked in conjunction to determine whether the defendant engaged in drug trafficking. The first officer sent a confidential informant to the same location on two occasions. Both times, the defendant pulled up in her car and spoke with a third party. The third party went in to a home. The confidential informant returned with drugs. The man at the home served as an intermediary between the defendant and the confidential information. The first officer did not want the defendant to connect his informant to the transactions, so he asked a second officer to stop the defendant’s vehicle. The second officer made the stop, claiming the defendant had failed to illuminate her license plate. This alleged traffic violation could not withstand scrutiny. 

The Court of Appeals ruled the drug evidence seized from the car must be suppressed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed holding the first officer’s suspicion of the defendant trafficking in drugs was shared/”transferred” to the second officer. This suspicion justified the traffic stop and the seizing of the drug evidence.

Contributed by Euva Blandford

KYSC - Yates - prosecutorial vindictiveness

Yatesv. Commonwealth, 2015-SC-504, to be published

Incest, Unlawful Transaction with a minor, use of a minor in a sexual performance, unlawful imprisonment, first-degree sexual abuse. 70 year sentence.

This case involves a re-trial following the Kentucky Supreme Court’s reversal and remand of the case to the trial court. The Commonwealth added four additional counts to the indictment without receiving any new evidence to justify the counts. The Court found a reasonable probability of prosecutorial vindictiveness and reversed the convictions for incest, use of a minor in a sexual performance, and unlawful imprisonment and remanded to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss those charges. However, Yates’s conviction for unlawful transaction with a minor and first-degree sexual abuse remain.

The Court found sufficient evidence to overcome a directed verdict motion on the unlawful transaction with a minor charge. Further, re-trying Mr. Yates on this charge, despite a finding of acquittal as a lesser included offense of rape, did not violate double jeopardy. The victim’s mother’s testimony vouching for the victim’s credibility was harmless error.

Contributed by Euva Blandford

KYSC - Huddleston - Parole Eligibility Information

Huddlestonv. Commonwealth, 2016-SC-673, to be published

Murder. Attempt Murder. Other related crimes. LWOP.

Huddleston shot and killed his estranged girlfriend and her brother. Huddleston claimed extreme emotional disturbance due to the recent break up with his girlfriend caused him to “snap.”

Exclusion of parole eligibility information during the death penalty phase is not required. The Court overruled Perdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. 1995) which had previously held that parole eligibility information “ha[d] no place in a death penalty hearing.” In this case, the defense wanted to introduce parole eligibility to demonstrate that a term of years could result in a lengthy sentence and was a better option than a death sentence. Noting that the trial court was constrained by Perdue, the Court did not apply is new analysis retroactively to this case. Further, the Court found no prejudice. “We see no reasonable probability that the jury which bypassed [LWOP 25] might have otherwise opted for imprisonment for a term of years with an even earlier parole date.”

Prior acts against the family were properly admitted. Defendant’s prior acts including stabbing the victim, threatening her family, stealing her mom’s cell phone and setting mom’s car on fire. The trial court admitted the evidence listing the possibilities from 404(b)(1) without any explanation or analysis for the relevance of the evidence. The Court took issue with the trial court’s “scattershot approach” and recommended a “precisely targeted explanation” by the court. Despite the trial court’s inadequate analysis, the Court found no error. The Court re-iterated the 3 step analysis for 404(b) issues delineated in Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994)

Even though the witness was 3 years old when he witnessed the crime and 6 years old when he testified, the trial court did not err by allowing him to “testify” he saw the shooting and by allowing him to identify the defendant as the shooter. Court discusses KRE 601 analysis noting “age is not determinative of competency.”

Failure to administer oath to child witness was not palpable error. KRE 601 discussion. The child’s testimony was “merely cumulative” to other testimony and consistent with defendant’s admissions. Further, the prejudicial effect of the child’s testimony did not outweigh its probative value.

DISSENT by Cunningham cautioning prosecutors about using a “child of such tender years to solicit evidence which was not that critical to the Commonwealth’s case.”

Contributed by Euva Blandford