Showing posts with label Instructions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Instructions. Show all posts

Monday, February 19, 2018

KYSC - Caudill - self-defense instruction



Commonwealthv. Caudill, 2016-SC-419-DG, to be published.
Wanton Endangerment and Self-Defense.

Self-protection is not a defense to conduct, to wit: wanton endangerment, that affects innocent bystanders, even though a defendant may be privileged to act in self-defense against his target. In this case, the instructions stated the jury could find Mr. Caudill guilty if they found his act of shooting a gun at his target was a wanton act placing a named third party at risk of serious physical injury. The instruction also required the jury to find Mr. Caudill was not acting in self-defense with regard to the name third party. The Kentucky Supreme Court found the “not acting in self-defense” as to the third party portion of the instruction was wrong. However, the Court found the error was harmless. 

Contributed by Euva Blandford

Monday, December 22, 2014

KY COA - Garcia - Man 2nd Instruction





Garcia v. Commonwealth, 2012-SC-01020, Not Published; Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part



A complicity instruction which read that the jury could find Brittney Garcia guilty of Manslaughter Second degree if she possessed the same mens rea as her co-defendant was improper. The instruction should have told the jury to find a mens rea for Garcia of the kind of culpability required for a Manslaughter Second conviction. ON retrial, the combination principal-accomplice instruction should read, in part:



That at the time Angel Tucker was killed, Defendant (Garcia) intentionally breached her legal duty to protect Angel Tucker by failing to prevent Nickolas Staples’ use of the blunt force which killed Angel Tucker;



(4) That, regardless of whether Defendant (Garcia) intended for Angel to be killed, she at least intended that Nickolas Staples seriously physically injure her…



Roy Durham of the Appeals Branch represented Ms. Garcia on appeal.  

Contributed by Julia Pearson

Thursday, February 20, 2014

KYSC - Mitchell - Hybrid Representation/Jury Instruction/Misleading Photos

Dwayne Mitchell v. Commonwealth- KSC, 2/20/2014, to be published

The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court violated Mr. Mitchell’s right to hybrid representation by denying him the right to represent himself on a pre-trial motion while still retaining the services of counsel for the remainder of the proceedings. The trial court further erred in providing jury instructions that omitted an essential element of first-degree robbery and erroneously allowing the introduction of misleading photographs.  

Tom Ransdell and Kate Benward of DPA Appeals represented Mr. Mitchell on appeal.

Contributed by Karen Maurer

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

KYSC - West - Instructions, Prior Acts, Reverse Batson


 Christopher West v. Commonwealth, 2011-SC-000629-MR (6/20/13)

The Court held Mr. West was entitled to a lesser included jury instruction on second degree fleeing and evading. Mr. West denied making the threats of domestic violence which elevated the offense to first degree fleeing and evading. Also the alleged threats of domestic violence occurred an hour prior to Mr. West fleeing the police, thus jurors may have believed it was too remote to find he fled “immediately” from an act of domestic violence. The Court also held prior acts of violence against other victims were inadmissible, and the Commonwealth’s reverse Batson motion was improperly granted.   

Erin Yang represented Mr. West on appeal.  At trial Mr. West was pro se, assisted by Josephine Buckner as stand-by counsel.  

Contributed by Jason Apollo Hart 

Friday, March 15, 2013

KY SC - Miller - Ex Post Facto, Instructions



John Miller v.Commonwealth – KSC, 2/21/13, to be published 

 The Court reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing and vacated all costs and fees. The Court held there was an Ex Post Facto violation “because the jury instructions as written resulted in convictions for Class B incest, even though that penalty level was the result of a statutory amendment in the middle of the period of time in which the offenses were alleged to have occurred. During part of that time period, the incest statutes only allowed conviction of a Class C felony…As written, the instructions do not make that distinction [of when the offenses occurred], and there is no way to know whether the jury convicted him of a Class C or a Class B incest offense.” 

Contributed by Erin Yang