Dwayne Mitchell v. Commonwealth- KSC, 2/20/2014, to be published
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court violated Mr. Mitchell’s right to hybrid representation by denying him the right to represent himself on a pre-trial motion while still retaining the services of counsel for the remainder of the proceedings. The trial court further erred in providing jury instructions that omitted an essential element of first-degree robbery and erroneously allowing the introduction of misleading photographs.
Tom Ransdell and Kate Benward of DPA Appeals represented Mr. Mitchell on appeal.
Contributed by Karen Maurer
Showing posts with label Karen Maurer. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Karen Maurer. Show all posts
Thursday, February 20, 2014
Wednesday, February 19, 2014
KYCOA - Jones - Restitution held open
Thomas Jones v. Commonwealth, 2012-CA-001827 [NOT TO BE PUBLISHED]
Thomas Jones
pled guilty to sexual contact with a then fifteen year old girl. A result
of this contact was that the girl contracted herpes. The trial court,
when ordering restitution, attempted to “hold open” the restitution order, and
allow the girl to petition the court for additional restitution if her
circumstances changed. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that this
violated KRS 532.033 because it was not a “set and definite amount.”
John
Landon represented Mr. Jones on Appeal; Margot Merrill preserved
this issue in the trial court.
Contributed by Karen Maurer
Monday, February 17, 2014
KYCOA - Brown - Protective Sweep
Brown v. Commonwealth – COA, 2/14/14, reversing and remanding, to be published
Police received information that
Appellant and two other men had assaulted a woman with a handgun and retreated
to Appellant’s home. Police also knew that Appellant had an AK-47 assault
rifle inside the house. Police went to the residence and ordered the men
out. The three men emerged with two women and informed the officers no
one remained inside. Officers conducted a protective sweep of the house
and found guns, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. The Court found that
the officers did not have articulable information to reasonably believe
someone remained inside the home. A general concern that someone might
still be in there did not justify the search.
Steve Buck represented Mr. Brown on appeal. Chris Tracy
represented Appellant in Fayette Circuit Court.
Contributed by Karen Maurer
Friday, November 22, 2013
KYSC - Brumley - Protective Sweep Search
SCT, 11/21/13, to be
published
The Court held that a “protective sweep” of Mr.
Brumley’s trailer was not permitted under the Fourth Amendment and Section 10
of the Ky. Constitution where Mr. Brumley was already in custody, outside the
trailer, when the officers made the decision to enter the trailer. The
fact that Mr. Brumley might be a gun owner mattered not. “Brumley's
rights under the Fourth Amendment cannot be diminished simply by exercising his
rights under the Second Amendment.” Neither did it matter that officers
heard a noise from the trailer. What is required for a Constitutional
protective sweep is “facts reasonably demonstrating that Brumley's home
harbored not just an additional individual, but rather an ‘individual posing a
danger to those on the arrest scene.’" The Court observed, “[The
officers’] primary objective of arresting Brumley without mishap having
been achieved, an attentive departure from the premises with their prisoner
would surely have been safer than an invasion of the home.”
Shanda
West-Stiles and C. B. Bates of the Columbia trial office represented Mr.
Brumley before the circuit court and preserved this issue, and Emily Rhorer
represented Mr. Brumley on appeal.
Contributed by Karen Maurer
Monday, October 7, 2013
KYSC - Melton - Court Costs and Public Defender Fees after incarceration
John Melton v. Commonwealth,
22-SC-488-MR (rendered 9/26/2013) (Not to be published)
The trial court erred in
attempting to retain jurisdiction until Mr. Melton was released from
incarceration in order to determine whether to impose court costs and partial
public defender fees. The Kentucky Supreme Court held there is no statutory
basis for a court to exercise jurisdiction beyond the end of proceedings (i.e.,
final sentencing) in order to determine the appropriateness of imposing court
costs and a partial public defender fee. Robert Yang represented Mr. Melton on
appeal.
Contributed by Karen Maurer
Friday, September 27, 2013
KYSC - Allen - Self Representation and Standby Counsel
Ricky Allen v. Commonwealth, 2011-SC-000009-MR (rendered 9/26/2013)(to be
published)
Mr. Allen ‘s Sixth Amendment rights were violated where Mr. Allen
was permitted to represent himself at trial, but was restricted from
participating in bench conferences. The trial court allowed only standby
counsel to participate in bench conferences based on the court’s determination
that Mr. Allen was a threat to either disrupt the proceedings or flee, which
left him unrepresented at critical stages of the trial proceedings. Mr.
Allen’s convictions of burglary in the third degree, criminal mischief in the first
degree, theft by unlawful taking over $300.00, receiving stolen property, under
$300.00, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree, for which
he received a sentence of twenty years, are reversed. Tom Ransdell and
Kate Benward represented Mr. Allen on appeal.
Contributed by Karen Maurer
Thursday, July 18, 2013
KYCOA - Brewer- Exigent Circumstances for Search
Barney Brewer v.Commonwealth – 2012-CA-001312 –
Rendered 6/21/13 - Not to be published
This case was affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded to the Wolfe Circuit Court after the panel of the
KY Court of Appeals determined that substantial evidence did not support the
trial court’s finding that either hot pursuit, fear of destruction of evidence,
or personal safety justified officers’ warrantless entry into a home.
The KSP
had received a tip that the manufacture of methamphetamine was occurring at Mr.
Brewer’s home. Several hours later, after gathering units from surrounding
counties, the officers decided to conduct a “knock and talk.” When the Troopers
saw Appellant run out of the back of the house, officers entered the property
and apprehended him. Once in the backyard, an odor was detected. Troopers
entered the home without a warrant. At the suppression hearing, the officers
had testified that they conducted a “person search” of the home “for officer
safety.” The trial court initially found that “hot pursuit” and “destruction of
evidence” exceptions to the warrant requirement applied, and then further the
“emergency exigent circumstances doctrine” due to the “explosive” nature of
meth manufacturing. The Court of Appeals held that Brewer’s decision to flee
gave rise to circumstances which justified the officers’ entry into the
backyard, but that all three theories of exigency were unsupported by the
record. The Court remanded the suppression issue to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine whether other exigent circumstances were present to
justify the officers’ entry.
Mr. Brewer was represented at trial by Hon.
Miranda Stevens. Molly Mattingly represented Mr. Brewer
on appeal.
Contributed by Karen Maurer
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