KY COA - M.A.M - Juvenile, Boykin, Pre-Adjudication Contempt

M.A.M. v. Commonwealth: ___, S.W.3d ____, 2013WL1488509 (Ky. App. 2013)(Motion to Publish pending, not yet final):

Finding there was a Boykin violation even though counsel present when M.A.M not informed of what rights would be waived or the consequences of an admission to the charges. “the family court made no inquiry during the November 15, 2011 adjudication hearing as to the veracity of the charges or of the child's stipulation, and no inquiry was made as to whether M.A. M.'s stipulation was voluntary or coerced. Nor did the court inform the child during that hearing and before accepting his plea of what the possible consequences, in terms of the range of punishments, would be if he admitted his guilt.”  

The court also held that children cannot be held in contempt for pre-adjudication orders because have not received their full due process rights! Specifically the court held, “In the present case, the JSOO was entered based solely on the allegations against the child. M.A.M. did not receive his full due process rights before the order was entered. Consequently, the (court order) was not a valid court order, and the child could not be held in contempt for violating it.”

Practice Tip: Always object to the entering of pre-adjudication orders, but if they get entered you can argue against any pick-up orders or contempt hearings based on violations of these pre-adjudication orders on due process grounds.

Contributed by La Mer Kyle-Griffiths

D.G. - Contempt - No Boykin

D.G. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Court of Appeals, Fayette County, TO BE PUBLISHED

The court vacated and remanded the court’s order finding child in contempt as well as accepting the plea on the underlying juvenile status offense.  The Court held that contempt cannot be found where the underlying guilty plea did not receive the full due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution under KRS 600.020(61)(d) and 610.010(11). 

In this case, there was no Boykin colloquy at the time that D.G. entered the plea, in fact the attorney just stated that there would be a stipulation.  Thus, the court held the plea was not clearly voluntary and intelligent since there was little to no explanation of possible consequences of an admission prior to accepting it.  The court reiterated that juvenile’s should have heightened assurance of the protection of their rights. 

Since the plea was entered without these protections, the court orders that the court held D.G. in contempt of were not valid court orders and thus both findings were required to be vacated and the case remanded back to family court.

Contributed by La Mer Kyle-Griffiths