Huddlestonv. Commonwealth, 2016-SC-673, to be published
Murder. Attempt Murder.
Other related crimes. LWOP.
Huddleston shot and
killed his estranged girlfriend and her brother. Huddleston claimed extreme
emotional disturbance due to the recent break up with his girlfriend caused him
to “snap.”
Exclusion of parole eligibility information during the death penalty
phase is not required. The Court overruled Perdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. 1995) which had
previously held that parole eligibility information “ha[d] no place in a death
penalty hearing.” In this case, the defense wanted to introduce parole
eligibility to demonstrate that a term of years could result in a lengthy
sentence and was a better option than a death sentence. Noting that the trial
court was constrained by Perdue, the
Court did not apply is new analysis retroactively to this case. Further, the
Court found no prejudice. “We see no reasonable probability that the jury which
bypassed [LWOP 25] might have otherwise opted for imprisonment for a term of
years with an even earlier parole date.”
Prior acts against the family were properly admitted. Defendant’s
prior acts including stabbing the victim, threatening her family, stealing her
mom’s cell phone and setting mom’s car on fire. The trial court admitted the
evidence listing the possibilities from 404(b)(1) without any explanation or
analysis for the relevance of the evidence. The Court took issue with the trial
court’s “scattershot approach” and recommended a “precisely targeted
explanation” by the court. Despite the trial court’s inadequate analysis, the
Court found no error. The Court re-iterated the 3 step analysis for 404(b)
issues delineated in Bell v. Commonwealth,
875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994)
Even though the witness
was 3 years old when he witnessed
the crime and 6 years old when he
testified, the trial court did not err by allowing him to “testify” he saw the
shooting and by allowing him to identify the defendant as the shooter. Court
discusses KRE 601 analysis noting
“age is not determinative of competency.”
Failure to administer oath to child witness was not palpable error. KRE
601 discussion. The child’s testimony was “merely cumulative” to other
testimony and consistent with defendant’s admissions. Further, the prejudicial
effect of the child’s testimony did not outweigh its probative value.
DISSENT by Cunningham
cautioning prosecutors about using a “child of such tender years to solicit
evidence which was not that critical to the Commonwealth’s case.”
Contributed by Euva Blandford
