KYSC - Caudill - self-defense instruction

Commonwealthv. Caudill, 2016-SC-419-DG, to be published.

Wanton Endangerment and Self-Defense.

Self-protection is not a defense to conduct, to wit: wanton endangerment, that affects innocent bystanders, even though a defendant may be privileged to act in self-defense against his target. In this case, the instructions stated the jury could find Mr. Caudill guilty if they found his act of shooting a gun at his target was a wanton act placing a named third party at risk of serious physical injury. The instruction also required the jury to find Mr. Caudill was not acting in self-defense with regard to the name third party. The Kentucky Supreme Court found the “not acting in self-defense” as to the third party portion of the instruction was wrong. However, the Court found the error was harmless. 

Contributed by Euva Blandford

KYSC - Ragland reversal

Patrick Ragland v. Commonwealth, WL 9243531 (Ky. 2015) Published. Final

Self-defense instructions. This case was reversed for a new trial because the jury should have been instructed that Ragland was privileged to use physical force, including deadly force, if he believed it was necessary to protect himself from sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat. 

Stand Your Ground immunity from prosecution can be raised by writ, but this case now also holds that a defendant is entitled to appellate review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity from prosecution due to legally justifiable use of force.

Adoptive admission by silence. witness's testimony that defendant said nothing when victim introduced her to defendant as “the guy I play house with,” did not come within exception to rule against hearsay for party's adoptive admission implied through silence.

Evidence that victim was HIV-positive was relevant to defendant's claim that he killed victim in self-defense, out of fear that he could contract disease, after victim attempted to engage in sexual intercourse with defendant.

Lucas Roberts and Daniel Whitley, trial counsel.
Susan Balliet, appellate counsel.

KYCOA- Wigginton - Use of Force

Stacey L. Wigginton- COA, 11/06/15, to be published.  Reversing.

 

Stacey L. Wigginton entered a conditional guilty plea to reckless homicide, a Class D felony, for killing her ex-husband and was sentenced to serve five years.  Pursuant to her plea, she appealed the Circuit Court’s denial of her assertion of immunity from prosecution under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 503.085.  Ms. Wigginton argued that the trial court applied the improper standard for determining whether she was justified in using physical force and that the Commonwealth failed to establish probable cause that her use of force was unlawful. 

The Commonwealth argued that the facts before the trial court as detailed in the discovery, medical records, and statements of Nancye Riley, Ms. Wigginton’s mother, all show that Stacey was not in imminent danger of “death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055.”  See KRS 503.050(2). 

The Court of Appeals found, “According to Kentucky Supreme Court case law, the burden was not on Stacey to come forth with evidence to support her claim of immunity under the self-defense statute.  Rather, ‘[t]he burden [was] on the Commonwealth to establish probable cause and it may do so by directing the court’s attention to the evidence of record including witness statements, investigative letters prepared by law enforcement officers, photographs and other documents of record.’  Rodgers v. Commonwealth 285 S.W.3d 740, 755 (Ky. 2009).”  In addition to the evidence of record, there is a long line of cases allowing the admission of a victim’s other acts of violence, if known to the defendant, when self-defense is claimed.  Moreover, a justifiable fear leading to the use of deadly force can be based on prior assaults or threats.  Cases allowing such evidence have turned on threats made by the victim, or multiple instances of violence, or a substantial combination of the two. 

The Court of Appeals held, “Herein, the trial court was to assess the evidence in the record to determine whether the Commonwealth had met its burden that there was a substantial basis to make a probable cause conclusion that Staceey’s use of deadly force was not legally justifiable.  Absent this, Rodgers holds that the case should be dismissed.  The Court of Appeal, having reviewed the record, concluded that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden in this case because the statements of Stacey and Nancye certainly did not support the Commonwealth’s burden of probable cause that the use of deadly force was not justified. 

The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the Graves Circuit Court.  Katie L. Benward, formally of the Appeals Branch and Roy A. Durham II of the Appeals Branch represented Ms. Wigginton on appeal.  Nathan Goodrich of the Murray office represented Ms. Wigginton in the trial court.    

Contributed by Kathleen Schmidt